As mentioned in my previous comment, the "pan-democrats" (including the Democratic Party (DP), the Civic Party (CP), the League of Social Democrats (LSD), the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood (ADPL) and their allies, which occupied 23 seats in the 60-seat LegCo) -who had the power to veto any constitutional reform package in the form of amendments to Annexes I and II to the Basic Law which require a two-thirds majority in LegCo -were opposed to the proposal in the Consultation Document. Nevertheless, after considering the views of members of the public collected during the three-month consultation period for the Consultation Document, the Government on 14 April 2010 formally announced
its Package of Proposals for the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2012
3 -a constitutional reform proposal ("the Reform Package") that is basically the same as that proposed in the Consultation Document. The motions for the relevant amendments to Annexes I and II of the Basic Law for the purpose of implementing the Reform Package were formally submitted to LegCo on 7 June 2010 for debate and voting on 23 June 2010.
The reasons for the pan-democrats' opposition to the Reform Package have been documented in my previous comment. It is noteworthy, however, that as from autumn 2009, the pan-democrats became split (2010) HKLJ into two camps (the "moderate" and "radical" camps) which adopted different approaches or strategies in their struggle for democratisation in the HKSAR. The "radical" camp, consisting of the CP and LSD, engaged in the "referendum" campaign to gather mass support for democratisation and the abolition of functional constituencies. 4 The "moderate" camp, led by the DP which cooperated with some prodemocracy groups, politicians and scholars in forming the Alliance for Universal Suffrage, 5 sought to work out concrete demands and proposals and negotiate with the HKSAR Government and Beijing. 6 Despite a statement from the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Offi ce of the State Council in Beijing 7 that the "referendum" advocated by the CP and LSD would be inconsistent with Hong Kong's constitutional status and contrary to the Basic Law, the CP and LSD on 21 January 2010 formally launched the campaign of fi ve of their LegCo members resigning so as to trigger what they promoted as a de facto referendum in each of the fi ve geographical constituencies for LegCo elections in the HKSAR on the introduction of genuine universal suffrage (for the election of the Chief Executive and all legislators) and abolition of functional constituencies for LegCo elections. The resignations were tendered in the following week, and the by-election to fi ll the resulting vacancies in LegCo was held on 16 May 2010. The pro-Government political parties and groups boycotted the election, although some candidates with no backing from major political parties and groups participated in it. The resigned legislators were all returned to LegCo. The voter turnout rate was only 17.1 per cent, 8 but the CP and LSD claimed success and pointed to the fact that half a million voters (ie 85 per cent of those who voted) had voted in support of their platform.
Meanwhile, the DP and its allies in the Alliance for Universal Suffrage formulated various demands and hoped to persuade the HKSAR Government and Beijing to accept them in exchange for their support for the 4 The strategy of pro-democracy legislators' resignation from LegCo to trigger a de facto referendum on democratisation was fi rst announced by the CP on 6 Sept 2009.
5
The Alliance (also translated as the "Alliance for Ultimate Universal Suffrage") was formed on 24 Jan 2010. See the Alliance's website www.universalsuffrage.hk, which provides, inter alia, the text of its "Proposal on the Road Map to Universal Suffrage" (dated 29 Mar 2010), http://www. universalsuffrage.hk/?p=25&lang=en (last visited 22 July 2010). The statement was made on 15 Jan 2010 and reported in Hong Kong newspapers on 16 Jan.
8
In the LegCo election of 2008, the voter turnout rate was 45.2%.
Government's constitutional reform proposal. Such demands included, inter alia, Beijing's clarifi cation that the "universal suffrage" promised in the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) Decision of 2007 9 is genuine universal suffrage conforming to internationally recognised principles of universality and equality in the electoral system, the nomination "threshold" 10 for the candidates for the election of the Chief Executive (CE) by universal suffrage in 2017 being no higher than the existing nomination threshold for the election of the CE by the Election Committee, the abolition of functional constituencies by the time universal suffrage is introduced for the election of all legislators (in 2010), the adoption of an electoral model for the election of LegCo in 2010, the improvement of the Government's Reform Package to include more democratic elements (eg increasing the newly introduced LegCo seats from 10 to 20; or, instead of elected District Councillors electing 5 additional LegCo seats as proposed in the Reform Package, the additional seats should be elected by universal suffrage (by all voters except those already eligible to vote in existing functional constituencies) upon nomination by elected District Councillors), and the establishment of an institutionalised forum for discussion between the HKSAR Government, Beijing and politicians in Hong Kong on issues of future constitutional development in Hong Kong.
Beijing adopted a strategy of differential treatment of the "moderate" and "radical" camps of the pan-democrats in Hong Kong. Whereas it strongly condemned the "referendum" triggered by the resignation of CP and LSD legislators, it indicated its willingness to engage in a dialogue with the moderates, including the DP, the ADPL and the Alliance for Universal Suffrage. Three widely publicised meetings were held between Mr Li Gang, Vice-Director of the Liaison Offi ce of the Central Government in the HKSAR and representatives of these three groups respectively on the week of 24 May 2010. In particular, the meeting with the DP leaders on 24 May was generally recognised as an important breakthrough or an "ice-breaking voyage" in the relationship between the DP and Beijing: Many of the founders and leaders of the DP had supported the student movement in Beijing in 1989, established the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China, and have continued to serve in the leadership of the Alliance since then. The Alliance organised annual demonstrations calling for the rehabilitation of the student movement and annual vigils to mourn On 7 June 2010, the HKSAR Government submitted to LegCo the motion for implementing the Reform Package for debate and voting by LegCo before the end of June. The Government made no change to the Reform Package despite the pan-democrats' opposition and their publicly stated position that they would veto the motion. On the same day, Mr Qiao Xiaoyang, Vice-Secretary-General of the NPCSC and Chairman of the Hong Kong Basic Law Committee of the NPCSC, made an important speech in which he attempted to respond to the demands of the DP and its allies. He pointed out that questions such as the nomination "threshold" for candidates for election of the CE by universal suffrage and the fate of functional constituencies as LegCo moves towards election of all legislators by universal suffrage could only be resolved by discussion in future.
11 In the same speech, Mr Qiao acknowledged (for the fi rst time in a speech by a senior PRC offi cial)
12 that "universal suffrage" implies universal and equal electoral rights.
13 But he also pointed out that the international practice is that such rights may be subject to reasonable legal restrictions, and that in the case of Hong Kong, the future electoral system should be consistent with the legal status of the HKSAR and its executive-led political system, should take into account the interests of all social classes in Hong Kong, and should be conducive to the development of Hong Kong's capitalist economy. In his speech, Mr Qiao also commented on the DP's proposal of letting the additional LegCo seats for the District Councils functional constituency be elected by all voters in Hong Kong (other than those who already have the right to vote in an existing functional constituency). He noted that some people had pointed out that this was a form of de facto or quasi Given that the Government did not make any concessions by modifying its Reform Package and Mr Qiao's speech failed to satisfy the pandemocrats, the scenario as of 7 June was that the motion for the Reform Package would be vetoed by the pan-democrats -a repetition of what happened in December 2005.
14 To the surprise of most observers, the situation suddenly changed on 14 June 2010, when Mr Henry Tang, Chief Secretary of the HKSAR Government, met with Mr Albert Chun-yan Ho, DP Chairman, and asked him whether the DP would support the Government's LegCo motion for constitutional reform if the Government were to modify the Reform Package and accept the DP's proposal regarding the fi ve additional District Councils functional constituency seats being elected (after candidates have been jointly nominated by elected District Councillors) by all voters in Hong Kong who do not already have the right to vote in any existing functional constituency ("the DP's District Council electoral proposal"). 15 The affi rmative answer given by Mr Ho proved to be crucial. According to the DP's proposal, more than 3 million registered voters would be enfranchised with regard to the fi ve newly created LegCo functional constituency seats, and all voters in Hong Kong will have two votes -one in a geographical constituency, and one in a functional constituency. The Government's Reform Proposal involves, inter alia, the creation of 10 additional seats in LegCo, 5 of which being elected by universal suffrage in geographical constituencies, and 5 being elected by a new functional constituency consisting of elected District Councillors. 16 Actually, speaking to the media on 13 June 2010, Mr Albert Ho already indicated that if the Government were to accept the DP's District Council electoral proposal, he as DP Chairman would recommend to the DP that the DP should support the modifi ed constitutional reform package. He explained that at the beginning of the negotiations, it was not practicable to put forward this proposal as the Party's only single demand, and other demands were therefore put forward together with it. See "Albert Ho: I would support the political reform if the District Council direct election proposal is accepted" (何俊仁：區會直選方案獲接納願挺政改), Hong Kong Economic Journal (信報財經新聞), 14 June 2010, p 10. It has also been reported that when the DP leaders met with Mr Li Gang on 24 May, the District Council electoral proposal was particularly emphasised, although other demands were also put forward: see "Democratic Party: We will veto the political reform package if it is not changed" (民主黨：政改不 加碼即否决), "Five conditions set" (列五大條件), Ming Pao (明報), 25 May 2010, p A2. local legislation instead of in the amended Annexes to the Basic Law. At the LegCo meeting, the pan-democrats (including the DP) voted in support of a motion to postpone dealing with the Government's motions on the ground that the Government had announced a major revision to the Reform Package only two days ago, and more time should be allowed for public discussion. The pan-democrats' motion to postpone the matter was however defeated when voted on by the separate voting mechanism 20 (the majority of the legislators elected from functional constituencies opposed the motion). LegCo then proceeded to debate and vote on the Government's motions for amendment of Annexes I and II of the Basic Law. The motion for amendment of Annex I (regarding the electoral model for the CE in 2012) was passed by 46 to 13 votes on 24 June, and that for amendment of Annex II (regarding the electoral model for LegCo in 2012) passed by 46 to 12 votes on 25 June. These were the fi rst amendments to the Basic Law enacted since the Basic Law came into effect in 1997. A major breakthrough in Hong Kong's constitutional reform was thus achieved.
The pan-democrats were bitterly split on the DP's District Council electoral proposal and on the DP's vote in support of the Government's motions to amend Annexes I and II of the Basic Law. The CP, LSD and four other pan-democrats opposed the DP's stance and voted against the Government's motions. Two of the nine DP legislators also opposed the DP's position, and one of the two resigned from the DP in order to vote against the Government's motions. The DP leadership and its supporters justifi ed acceptance of the Government's modifi ed Reform Package by highlighting the progress in terms of democracy it achieved -10 more seats would be added to LegCo in 2012, with 5 elected by universal suffrage and the other 5 elected by "quasi-universal suffrage", with all voters having two votes (instead of the existing system of 200,000 voters having two votes and 3 million having only one). They also argued that the passage of the modifi ed Reform Package would pave the way for, and would in any event not be detrimental to, the eventual election of the CE and all legislators by universal suffrage. They pointed out that although the fi ve newly created "functional constituency" seats would be fi lled by elected District Councillors nominated by fellow District Councillors, their direct election by the people of Hong Kong would mean that they would be accountable to the people of Hong Kong instead of to narrow social sectors represented by existing functional constituencies. Opponents of the Government's modifi ed Reform Package argued that it did nothing to pave the way for the abolition of functional constituencies, and could not be considered progressive. They questioned whether acceptance of the package would only weaken the popular movement to strive for full democratisation in Hong Kong. They also pointed out that questions of the road map to and electoral models for eventual universal suffrage remain unresolved. Some of them even accused the DP of betraying the cause of democracy.
Given that as a matter of political reality, the only alternative to acceptance of the Government's modifi ed Reform Package was vetoing it (as the pan-democrats vetoed the 2005 reform package) and having another period of stagnation in Hong Kong's political development until at least 2016 (the time of the next LegCo election following the 2012 election covered by the Reform Package), the passage by the required two-thirds majority in LegCo of the resolutions for amendment of Annexes I and II should be welcomed. Some opponents of the modifi ed Reform Package have expressed the concern that the Package, in creating fi ve more functional constituency seats, would only perpetuate an unjust system and would be counterproductive in terms of the move towards universal suffrage. They also questioned whether the model (adopted in the modifi ed Reform Package) of members of a functional constituency nominating their members for election by the populace may become in future a model for reforming and thus perpetuating other functional constituencies, thus denying genuine universal suffrage. These are, however, questions for the future on which new political battles will be fought. The DP and other pan-democrats who supported the modifi ed Reform Package have made it clear that they will continue to fi ght in future for genuine universal suffrage and the abolition of functional constituencies. There is no confl ict between accepting the modifi ed Reform Package for 2012 and continuing this fi ght in future. As for the modifi ed Reform Package itself, it should be recognised that although it is far from perfect, it is more democratic than the existing political system of Hong Kong. The creation in 2012 of additional functional constituency seats in LegCo at the same time as creating additional seats elected by universal suffrage is unavoidable given the constraints imposed by the NPCSC Decision of 2007. But in accordance with the DP's District Council electoral proposal, major political parties, which will be able to win signifi cant numbers of elected District Council seats, will be able to nominate their District Councillors for election by the populace. Ordinary people in Hong Kong will therefore be able to vote for political parties of their choice, not only in the fi ve newly created seats elected directly by universal suffrage, but also in the other fi ve newly created seats of the District Councils functional constituency. The percentage of LegCo seats elected by universal suffrage or quasi-universal suffrage (in the case of the District Councils constituency) will thus increase from 50 per cent (in the existing system) to 57 per cent. It cannot be denied that this is a step forward in terms of the democratisation of the HKSAR.
Politics is, in the fi nal analysis, the art of the possible. Since the HKSAR Government put forward the Reform Package in April 2010 which was met by the pan-democrats' opposition, it seemed that the scenario of the pan-democrats vetoing the Government's constitutional reform proposal in December 2005 was likely to repeat itself. Breaking the deadlock was no easy task. This time the "moderate" democrats adopted the innovative strategy of seeking to establish a dialogue with Beijing. In agreeing to meet with them, Beijing made a major policy shift with regard to its relationship with the pan-democrats in Hong Kong, who had for a long time been viewed as anti-Beijing and opposing whatever Beijing said.
Yet, when the DP fi rst met with Mr Li Gang of the Liaison Offi ce on 24 May 2010, their positions seemed to be poles apart. For example, the DP sought assurance from Beijing that there would in 2017 and 2020 be genuine universal suffrage for the election of the CE and all legislators respectively, in the sense of a low nomination "threshold" for candidates for the CE election and the abolition of all functional constituencies. They also demanded an undertaking from Beijing that the proportion of seats directly elected by universal suffrage would be increased in the LegCo of 2016, and the separate voting mechanism should be abolished at that time.
21 From Beijing's point of view, questions of what precise electoral models will be adopted in 2016, 2017 and 2010 can only be settled in accordance with the fi ve-step procedure stipulated in the NPCSC Interpretation of 2004. 22 The fi ve-step procedure may only be initiated near the time of the relevant elections. Apart from this legal consideration, there is also the political reality that in order to settle these questions, discussion in Hong Kong among various political forces and in civil society would be necessary. Such discussion is expected to be lengthy and can take place only in future, after the Reform Package for 2012 has been dealt with.
Another principal demand put forward by the DP at its meeting with Mr Li was the DP's District Council electoral proposal. Mr Li questioned whether the proposal was consistent with the NPCSC Decision of 2007 regarding the ratio of functionally elected and directly elected legislators in 2012. 23 In my view, there was indeed a genuine legal question regarding the compatibility of the proposal with the NPCSC Decision. 24 The proposal was, as acknowledged subsequently by leading members of the DP, a form of de facto or quasi direct election. It was most probably outside the contemplation of the NPCSC when making the Decision of 2007 that "election by functional constituencies" could mean the kind of election in the DP's District Council electoral proposal.
It may thus be seen that the ultimate passage of the Government's Reform Package as modifi ed by the DP's proposal was the result of a compromise in which both Beijing and the HKSAR Government on the one hand and the DP made major concessions. It was a classic instance of bargaining and give-and-take in order to make a deal. Both sides would like to see Hong Kong go one step forward in its constitutional reform and democratisation and therefore had the incentive to engage and cooperate with each other. The DP ultimately recognised that for both legal and political reasons, it was impossible to extract from Beijing any meaningful undertakings regarding the precise electoral models for the CE and LegCo after 2012. Thus it was more viable to focus on how the Reform Package for 2012 could be improved in terms of its democratic elements. The HKSAR Government had a strong incentive in securing the passage of the constitutional reform proposal, as its defeat would probably aggravate the lack of popularity and governance crisis which the Government already faced. Beijing probably understood the desperate need to bolster the authority of the HKSAR Government by securing the passage of the constitutional reform proposal. Having initiated the dialogue with the "moderate" democrats, it probably also understood 23 See the DP Report mentioned in n 6 above, para 12. The Report disclosed that when DP leaders met with Chief Executive Donald Tsang on 7 June 2010, Mr Tsang told them that he had recommended the DP's District Council electoral proposal to the Beijing authorities three times but without success (see p 27 of the Report). DP Chairman Mr Albert Ho also disclosed that he had met with Mr Tsang several times to discuss the Government's political reform package, and Tsang told him every time that the DP's proposal was contrary to the NPCSC Decision: see "Democratic Party praises Elsie Leung for her contribution to the political reform" (民主黨讚 梁愛詩政改功臣), Ming Pao (明報), 9 July 2010, p A6. 24 In an interview with Ta Kung Pao (大公報) published on 10 June 2010 (p A6) ("Albert Chen: The Opposition's proposal is diffi cult to implement" (陳弘毅：反對派方案難實現), I expressed the view that the proposal would probably be considered inconsistent with the NPCSC Decision, as the proposed mode of election was much closer to direct elections than to functional constituency elections. That view was based on the traditional understanding of functional constituencies as being for the purpose of the representation of the interests of a particular trade, occupation, profession, or sector, and the traditional principle that the LegCo member(s) elected by a functional constituency (such as the District Councils functional constituency established since 1999) should be nominated and elected by members of that functional constituency (and not elected by persons outside that functional constituency that the failure of the dialogue (in achieving anything positive in terms of constitutional reform) would lead to the "moderate" democrats being sidelined and the "radical" democrats -those who engineered the "referendum" which had upset Beijing so much -taking over leadership of the pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong. Thus Beijing ultimately chose to adopt a fl exible and creative interpretation of the NPCSC Decision of 2007 (instead of one sticking to its original intention) in giving its blessings to the HKSAR Government's Reform Package as modifi ed by the DP's proposal. The DP was vehemently attacked by some radical democrats, particularly those in the LSD, for supporting the modifi ed Reform Package. The developments of June 2010 are expected to change signifi cantly the political landscape of Hong Kong. As suggested by a recent survey, 25 a reshuffl ing of voters' allegiance is under way. The DP has lost the support of some of its previous voters, but has gained the support of some others who previously voted for other pro-democracy parties or for pro-establishment parties. Corresponding changes in voters' allegiance have been detected with regard to other political parties in Hong Kong. It is possible that the traditional landscape of pro-establishment forces versus pro-democracy forces (gaining 40 per cent and 60 per cent of the popular votes respectively) 26 will give way to a threefold division of pro-establishment forces, the "moderate" democrats (led by the DP) and the "radical" democrats (led by the CP and LSD).
The process of the constitutional reform of 2010 underscores the increasing involvement of Beijing in Hong Kong politics. However, a distinction should be drawn here between "ordinary politics" and "constitutional politics". In the case of the former, Beijing has so far respected the autonomy of the HKSAR Government in decision-making on social, economic and other policies in Hong Kong's domestic affairs in accordance with the Basic Law. But as far as "constitutional politics" is concerned, the NPCSC Interpretation of 2004 and the fi ve-step procedure it specifi ed for constitutional reform 27 inevitably result in Beijing's involvement in decision-making on constitutional change in Hong Kong. The autonomy which the Basic Law confers on the HKSAR Government is autonomy to govern Hong Kong in accordance with the political system specifi ed in the Basic Law. But changes to the political system itself are not entirely within Hong Kong's autonomy; the precise roles of the HKSAR Government, the Hong Kong LegCo and Beijing in the process of constitutional reform are specifi ed in the Basic Law and the NPCSC Interpretation of 2004. In the particular case of the constitutional reform of 2010, it was logical for the moderate democrats in Hong Kong to discuss with Beijing matters such as the road map and models for universal suffrage after 2012, as the HKSAR Government had made it clear that it had not been authorised to deal with these matters. 28 Similarly, the crucial question of whether the DP's District Council electoral proposal was inconsistent with the NPCSC Decision of 2007 was a question which only Beijing could conclusively determine.
The momentous events of June 2010 marked not only a breakthrough in constitutional reform in Hong Kong, but also a breakthrough in the relationship between Beijing and the pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong. Since 1989, the poor relationship and lack of trust between the two sides has been, in this author's opinion, the biggest single stumbling block to Hong Kong's democratisation. 29 But now, in achieving the constitutional reform of June 2010, Beijing and the moderate wing of the pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong led by the DP have engaged in a dialogue and a process of give-and-take which, coupled with the positive intermediary role played by the HKSAR Government, have proved to be useful and constructive. The future democratisation of the HKSAR depends not only on the existence of a HKSAR Government with prodemocracy inclinations, but also on further interaction and cooperation between the moderate and pragmatic elements in both the Beijing Government and pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong. For this, a good foundation has been laid, a useful precedent established, and a minimum amount of mutual trust and good will secured, by the "miracle" 30 of the constitutional reform of June 2010.
28 See paras 1.28-1.29 of the Consultation Document referred to in the fi rst paragraph of this article, and paras 5.05-5.06 of the Package of Proposals referred to in the second paragraph of this article. 29 See the work cited in note 26 above. 30 It was widely believed in early June that unless a "miracle" happened, the Government's Reform Package would be vetoed by LegCo in June 2010.
